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This paper studies the effects of water sector privatizations on consumers’ welfare 
in 46 municipalities in Colombia. First, the privatization process is described.   
Second, the paper evaluates the impact of privatization on access, price, and quality 
of water as well as health outcomes using differences-in-differences methodology 
with variation across time (before and after privatization) and between treatment 
and control groups (privatized and non-privatized municipalities) and controlling 
for household and municipality characteristics. The results show positive effects of 
privatization, in particular in urban areas. There are four main results: (i) 
Privatization in urban areas increases access, has positive effects on the quality 
measured as the need for treatment and the aspect of the water (e.g., presence of 
particles in the water), and improves health outcomes, as well as improves the 
frequency of the service for the lower quintiles. (ii) Privatization increases the price 
of water in the lower quintiles, although these effects may be the result of the joint 
implementation of privatization and the elimination of cross subsidies. (iii) In 
privatized municipalities with better governmental technical capacities there are 
positive effects on access, prices and quality. (iv) the positive effects of 
privatization in rural areas on the frequency of the service and on health outcomes 
are outweighed by negative impacts on access and prices. These results suggest that 
the benefits found in urban areas should be expanded to rural areas, and that the 
service should be more targeted toward the poorest. 
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1. Introduction 
Management of the water sector is difficult. On one hand, water is essential for life, and access to 
good quality water is necessary in order to improve standards of living of the population. 
Moreover, externalities, such as effects on health, compel the state to intervene. On the other 
hand, private participation is likely to improve the efficiency of the sector in the provision of 
service. These two contradictory concerns can be resolved through private participation and a 
regulatory scheme that assures access and quality of the service, especially for the poor. For that 
purpose, since the beginning of the 1990s Latin American countries have introduced various  
mechanisms of private participation (e.g., concessions, build operate and Transfer—BOT—
schemes,  joint ventures, capitalization, and leases, among others) accompanied by regulation 
schemes. Colombia is no exception; its water sector has undergone two structural reforms since 
the end of the 1980s. First, water services were decentralized and now municipal governments 
are responsible for the provision of the service. Second, the 1991 constitutional reform 
introduced the mechanisms for private participation in this and other sectors that were controlled 
by the state.  
Privatizations have since then lost momentum and have even encountered significant 
political opposition. In 2002, according to Latinobarómetro, an annual survey in 17 Latin 
American countries, 61 percent of respondents
2 disagreed with the statement that privatizations 
have been beneficial to the country. In Colombia, 65 percent of the population disagrees with 
privatizations. However, the effect of water privatizations on welfare has not been fully studied. 
In fact, cross-country evidence in the region is inconclusive. On one hand, Clarke et al. (2004) 
show in their study for Argentina, Bolivia and Brazil that access improved in both privatized and 
non-privatized zones, suggesting that “Private Sector Participation, per se, may have not been 
responsible for these improvements” (Clarke, et al., 2004, p. 1). On the other hand, McKenzie 
and Mookherjee (2003) conclude in their study for Argentina, Bolivia, Mexico and Nicaragua 
that increased access at the bottom of the distribution outweighs the negative effect of increased 
prices. However, the effects on quality and on poverty are not conclusive.  
In order to address this uncertainty, this paper studies the effects of water privatizations 
on consumer welfare in Colombia. In particular, we measure the impact on access, quality and 
prices of water as well as on health outcomes. In spite of the unpopularity of privatizations, our 
                                                 
2 16,788 persons responded to this statement. See Carrera et al. (2004).   5
main results suggest that privatizations have positive effects on welfare, especially in urban 
areas. In privatized urban municipalities, we find an improvement in access to water, and an 
increase in the quality of water, measured as the need for water treatment or as the aspect of 
water. The frequency of the service, another measure of quality, decreases in privatized urban 
areas, but it increases for the lower quintiles. We also find a positive impact on health outcomes 
as measured by the weight for height ratio of children. In addition, in the urban areas of 
municipalities with better government technical capacities we find positive effects on access, 
payment and quality. In rural areas the negative effect of privatization on prices and strong 
negative effects on access to water outweigh the positive impacts on the improved frequency of 
the service and on improved child health, even after controlling for migration to these areas.  
As the results show, the low levels of support for privatizations reflected in surveys like 
Latinobarómetro can be explained through price effects. However, as we discuss below, 
privatization was undertaken simultaneously with the elimination of a cross-subsidy scheme, a 
factor that complicates explanation of changes in price. In addition, in terms of political economy 
the challenge is to expand the positive effects in urban areas to rural areas as well.   
The paper is organized in five sections, including this introduction. In the second we 
present a review of the water sector privatization process in Colombia since the early 1990s.  We 
additionally compare municipalities that privatized and those that did not in the evolution of key 
welfare variables related to the Colombian water sector (i.e., variables capturing access or 
coverage, prices, and consumption). In the third section we discuss the hypotheses and the 
econometric methodology used to test them. In the fourth section we analyze the data and present 
the results of our estimations. The fifth and final section presents the main conclusions.  
 
2. Water Privatization  
 
The rules of the game for private participation in the utility sector in Colombia were introduced 
in the 1991 constitutional reform. While Colombia began the privatization process relatively late 
in  comparison to other countries in the region, the country caught up rapidly during the period of 
1994-1997. Three factors help to explain this performance. First, until the mid-1990s, Colombia 
was the most stable economy in the region, with high and stable growth, stable inflation, and a 
relatively low fiscal deficit. As a result, there was no urgent need to adjust public finances.  
Second, political factors, especially the role of labor unions, impeded the privatization of   6
utilities. For example, the attempt to privatize the state-owned telecommunications company 
began in 1992 but was not completed achieved until 2004 due to labor union pressures. Third, 
since the beginning of the 1990s Colombia has decentralized the responsibility for most public 
utilities to sub-national governments, and consequently the central government’s power to 
influence privatization has become weak and indirect.  
The share of private participation in the water sector is low compared to private 
participation in other sectors (i.e., 2 percent of total private participation). However, as in other 
countries, private participation in this sector has limitations for a variety of reasons. First, until 
the end of the 1980s, the sector was a State monopoly with lower potential competence and high 
fixed costs. Second, externalities in this sector are more pronounced. The most important cited 
example is health, but there are others such as environmental, gender, and poverty externalities. 
These externalities compel the State not to leave the sector completely in hands of the private 
sector. In addition, the decentralization
3 of the sector could have affected private participation, as 
decentralization atomized the ownership of enterprises
4 and limited the capacity of the central 
government to influence the privatization process.
5 The central government can only intervene 
indirectly through financial and other incentives for sub-national governments. The most 
important incentives implemented in Colombia are the “Programa de Modernizacion 
Empresarial” (PME) and the “Programa de Privatizaciones y Concesiones en el Sector Agua,” 
both designed in 1997. These programs give technical and financial assistance to municipalities 
to design private-public participation projects. Applying these incentives, the National 
Department of Planning and the Ministry of Economic Development implemented three pilot 
projects in medium cities:
6 Montería, Pasto and Bucaramanga (DNP, 1997).  
Table 1 shows private participation in the sector in municipalities with a population 
greater than 100,000, and Table 2 lists small city projects implemented by PME up to 2003. 
Some of the projects presented in Table 1 were implemented before the design of the incentive 
programs (e.g., Barranquilla, Cartagena, Girardot, and Tunja). Others, like the Metroagua project 
                                                 
3 The decentralization process began in Colombia in 1986 with the popular election of majors and was reinforced in 
the 1991 constitutional reform with the transfer of tax revenues and responsibilities.  
4 According to the Public Services Superintendency (2002), there are approximately 2,300 enterprises in the water 
and sanitation sector.  
5 Until the end of the 1980s, this sector was managed by the “Instituto de Fomento Municipal” (Insfopal), a central 
government agency that was closed in 1986. 
6 Medium cities are cities with population greater than 100,000 and smaller than 1,000,000.   7
in Santa Marta, were implemented later on but without the participation of the central 
government.  
Two additional points are worth mentioning. First, given the sector’s strong externalities, 
the government is in most cases responsible for financing long-term investment to assure 
coverage. Second, water and sanitation supply in the three largest Colombian cities—Bogota, 




Box 1. Private Participation in Barranquilla and Cartagena 
 
Barranquilla  (20-year lease) 
 
Since 1960, the Municipal Public Enterprises of Barranquilla (EPM) managed water and 
sanitation services. Political manipulation of the EPM was widespread, and the state-owned firm 
reached technical bankruptcy by the early 1990s. At the end of 1990, water coverage was only 60 
percent, and operating expenditures consistently exceeded revenues. In 1991, due to deficient 
service and poor management, the central government supported a process of institutional 
transformation leading to the liquidation of the EPM and the creation of the Sociedad de 
Acueducto, Alcantarillado y Aseo de Barranquilla, S.A. (Triple A). The District of Barranquilla 
retained 89 percent of the shares in the newly created firm and sold 11 percent to the local 
private sector. The private sector was involved through the creation of a mixed enterprise 
responsible for administering the assets of the system owned by the municipality, while the city 
was responsible for investment projects. In 1995, the municipality reduced its ownership to 50 
percent, reduced local private sector participation to 6.7 percent, and sold 43.3 percent of the 
ownership to Aguas de Barcelona.  
 
Cartagena (20-year lease) 
 
In 1995, the municipality of Cartagena signed a lease contract with Aguas de Cartagena, a firm 
partially owned by Aguas de Barcelona (46 percent) and by other private investors (4 percent); 
the municipal government kept a 50 percent share. The contract was negotiated directly with 
Aguas de Barcelona and was not put up for bidding. The new company had control of a major 
sector investment program, which was financed with a municipal loan from the World Bank and 
the Inter-American Development Bank. In addition to its participation as a shareholder, Aguas de 
Barcelona also signed a management contract, for which it received a fixed share of revenues. 
The introduction of private sector participation improved the performance of the sector.  
 
Sources: Clarke et al. (2004) and Nickson (2001).   8
In addition to the introduction of private participation in State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) 
looking for economic efficiency, the 1991 constitutional reform introduced a regulatory 
framework to avoid perverse distributional effects and guarantee a fair competition. As 
competition should benefit consumers, the regulatory framework intervenes through price 
mechanisms.  These mechanisms include prohibiting prices lower than operational costs so that 
competitive enterprises are not driven out of business by other companies willing to take 
temporary losses in order to increase their market share; a second mechanism is the use of price 
caps to prevent excessive rent-seeking by utilities (Prasad, 2005). The regulatory framework is 
also important for the water and sanitation sector since the increased openness of the economy 
introduced competition into all tradable markets, and the monopoly problem was confined to the 
public services that are often considered natural monopolies, such as energy distribution, water 
and sanitation services, and telecommunications.  
Three laws rule these objectives: the Privatization Law (Law 226 of 1995), the public 
services law (Law 142 of 1994) and the electricity law (Law 143 of 1994). The Privatization 
Law assures the participation of workers in the privatization process, or the democratization of 
property. For this purpose any SOE should be sold in two steps. In the first, the SOE is offered to 
its workers under special conditions in terms of length and loans, and with a fixed price. In the 
second, the SOE is offered to the public in general, with competitive price mechanisms. In 
general, the base price of the first step is lower than that in the second step (DNP, 1997). 
The law of public services designed the regulatory framework. Among their most 
important characteristics, this law requires the incorporation of public service providers as 
“Sociedades por acciones” (ESP), which aims to isolate firm management from political 
intervention. Two other important features are related to the tariff regime. First, the law intended 
to eliminate implicit subsidies, which are generally designed with political motives; at present  
there exists an explicit scheme of cross-subsidies to finance the lower income strata. However, to 
assure financial viability of the providers, making the tariff reflect their costs, the law set forth a 
transitional period in which this cross-subsidies scheme would be eliminated. Due to political 
pressure, the official deadline for closing the tariff gap between price and costs was extended 
until the end of 2005, although the cross-subsidy scheme nonetheless remains present in practice 
at the time of writing. In addition, given the intrinsic differences between the water and 
electricity sectors, the electricity law followed the general framework of the public services law   9
and developed specific aspects of the links between generation, transmission and distribution of 
electricity with a long-run plan for expansion. 
The public services law additionally defined the institutional organization of regulation. 
The regulatory scheme has a national scope, regulates both public and private enterprises, and is 
separated into two different agencies: a commission that is in charge of the policies of the sector, 
and a superintendency that is in charge of control. The three regulatory commissions for public 
services are the Energy and Gas Regulatory Commission (CREG), the Water and Sanitation 
Commission (CRA), and the Telecommunications Regulatory Commission (CRT). These 
commissions are responsible for planning the evolution of their sectors and guaranteeing the 
quality and coverage of public services. The “Superintendencia de Servicios Públicos” controls 
the performance of the public services sector and protects consumers’ welfare.  
  After these reforms, the stylized facts presented below show that coverage and prices in 
the sector increased in both municipalities that privatized and municipalities that did not.
7 Water 
and sewerage coverage, measured by the number of users and by the number of households, 
increased in both privatized and non-privatized municipalities (Table 3). In 2001, water coverage 
exceeded 90 percent in non-privatized municipalities, and with the exception of Monteria, Santa 
Marta, Sincelejo and Florencia, access is also above 90 percent in privatized municipalities. 
Compared to these numbers, sanitation coverage is lower in both privatized and non-privatized 
municipalities.  
With respect to prices, there exists a cross price-subsidies scheme from the higher strata 
(5 and 6) to the lower strata (1,2 and 3). However, following the transition toward eliminating 
the scheme defined by the law, tariffs in lower-income sectors have increased for municipalities 
both with and without private participation in the sector. Figures 1 to 4 show the change in tariffs 
per stratum between 2001 and 2004 for water and sewerage sectors in the four largest cities 
(Bogota, Medellin, Cali and Barranquilla).  In both sectors there has been an effort to reduce 
subsidies for the lowest strata, although tariffs in higher-income strata have also increased for 
sewerage. 
Cross-subsidies are still high, and the increase in tariffs for the poor to close the gap and 
ensure financial viability of the sector in the long run is important. Table 4 shows that on average 
                                                 
7 The stylized facts are based on DNP data, and on data collected by at the Regulatory Commission and the 
Superintendency of  Public Services.   10
the tariff for the poor is between 46 and 75 percent of the tariff of the higher strata, both for 
privatized and non-privatized firms (on average between 60 and 65 percent, respectively). To 
close the gap between tariffs and costs, and to avoid the distortions generated by cross-subsidies, 
low-income households’ tariff should increase between 35 and 40 percent in real terms, while for 
higher income households the tariff should be reduced by approximately 13 percent. 
As a result, water consumption has decreased. Table 5 shows the reduction in water 
consumption between 1997 and 2001 in the following main cities: Bogota, Medellin, Cali, 
Barranquilla, Bucaramanga and Cartagena. As described before, in the former three cities water 
and sanitary services are provided by the public sector, while in the latter three they have been 
privatized. Reduction in consumption has been higher for low-income households, except in 
Barranquilla, and, in a lesser degree, Medellin. However, the tendency is similar in cities both 
with and without private participation.  In sum, in the water and sanitation sector there is a trend 
of increasing coverage, higher prices and lower consumption, regardless of whether a 
municipalities’ services are public or privatized.  
 
 
Box 2. Consumer Satisfaction Survey 
 
The Superintendency of Public Services conducted a survey on consumer satisfaction after 10 
years of water and sanitary sector reform
8 in five principal Colombian cities: Bogota, Medellin, 
Cali, Barranquilla and Bucaramanga. The table below show the responses of questions about 
quality, price, and coverage. The survey reports that, in general, coverage and quality have 
increased in cities both with and without private participation,
9 and for all strata, but prices have 
increased as well. An important result is for Barranquilla, with the highest positive responses in 
terms of quality and prices and the second-highest satisfaction with coverage. 
 
                                                 
8 Data collected in June 2004; sample size 2,200 individuals distributed by income level: low (strata 1 and 2, 42 
percent), medium (strata 3 and 4, 51 percent) and high (strata 5 and 6 and nonresidential). 
9 The water providers of Bogota, Medellin and Cali are public, while Barranquilla and Bucaramanga’s providers  are 







Barranquilla 44 62 80
Bucaramanga 68 41 55
Bogota 86 47 36
Cali 78 41 36
Medellin 61 65 59
Barranquilla 56 61 72
Bucaramanga 73 40 51
Bogota 87 42 32
Cali 75 39 30







4 Lower income correspond to strata 1 and 2, middle income to strata 3 and 4, and 




3 Question: As compared to the quality of the utilities that you received 10 years 
ago, would you say that the quality 
1 Question: Keeping in mind the the quality of the service that you are receiving 
today, would you say the service is 














3. Hypotheses and Econometric Strategy 
 
The aggregate data from the previous section showed a similar pattern in prices and access for 
both privatized and non-privatized municipalities. However, this is a restricted, partial analysis, 
since its source of variation is at the municipal level and not from micro household data. In this 
section we present the econometric strategy for studying the impacts of privatizations in the 
water and sanitation sector on access, payment, quality, and health, using two sources of micro 
data.  
In general, we will estimate a functional form of the following equation:  
 
) , , , ( , , , , , , t j i t j t i t j i D X X f Y ε =   (1) 
 
where the impact variable (denoted as  t j i Y , , ) may be access to water, prices, quality of the 
service, or health outcomes for individual i living in municipality j at time t; D is a dichotomous   12
variable equal to 1 for individuals in municipalities in which privatization took place and equal 
to 0 for the comparison group of individuals (i.e., individuals in municipalities without 
privatization);  t i X ,  is a vector that includes control variables of the individuals and  t j X ,  a vector 
of municipal characteristics that affect the impact variable; and finally  t j i , , ε  captures the 
unobservable characteristics of the individuals. The subscript t denotes time variation (i.e., 1997, 
before privatization, and 2003, after privatization).   
We estimate a family in a difference-in-difference model under one identification 
assumption. We exploit variation at the household and municipality level, time variation (i.e., 
before and after privatization); and “treatment” variation (i.e., privatized and non-privatized 
municipality). 
The specification of Equation (1) to be estimated is the following: 
 
t j i t j t i t j i X X t D D t Y , , , 4 , 4 3 2 1 0 , , ) * ( ε β β β β + Β + Β + + + + =        (2a) 
 
and we present four estimations of the same equation: first, without controlling for the indices of 
technical capacity for the municipalities, but controlling for fixed effects at municipalities; 
second, controlling for the indices of technical capacity (invariant over time); second, estimating 
for urban and rural areas separately, and finally, including the possibility of differential effects 
across quintiles of income. The last variation is estimated using the following equation,  
  
t j i k t i
k
k t i t j t i t j i t D Q Q X X t D D t Y , , , , , 6 , 5 , 4 , 4 3 2 1 0 , , ) * * ( ) * ( ε β β β β β β + + + Β + Β + + + + = ∑  (2b) 
 
where  Q represents the quintiles. The impact of privatization is given by the difference-in-
difference estimator (DD ): 
 
















t X X X X D DD = = = = = = = = − − − + − − − + = ε ε ε ε β β   (3) 
 
which gives the effect of the treatment  ( D 1 β ) .  
Endogeneity problems in estimations of Equations (2a) and (2b)
10 occur when there are 
characteristics that are not observable by the researcher but influence the decision to carry out 
the privatization. For instance, suppose that privatization occurs in municipalities in which 
technical capacity is higher than in the rest of the country, presumably because the human capital 
                                                 
10 For a general discussion of endogeneity problems and econometric strategies, see Heckman et al. (1999).    13
of that municipality is higher. Also, suppose that the dependent variable  t j i Y , ,  is infant mortality, 
which presumably depends on the quality of the water but also on the “quality” of the household. 
Since a “better” quality of household and higher technical capacity are difficult to quantify, these 
unobservable characteristics will be included in the term  t j i , , ε  in Equation (2). At the same time, 
individuals in these municipalities may have a greater probability of living in a municipality in 
which privatization occurred and, therefore  0 ) , ( , , ≠ t j i D E ε , which makes  1 β  a biased estimate.  
To tackle the problem of endogeneity, we use the following identification assumption. 
The changes in the unobservable characteristics are equal across groups (treatment and control) 
or—a stronger assumption—the unobservable characteristics are equal for the treatment and 
control groups at each period of time. Hence, to estimate the true impact of privatization, we will 
make use of the following identification assumption: the unobservable characteristics are time 
invariant.   
In order to see why this makes theDD  unbiased, assume that  t j i , , ε  presents the structure 
t j i i t j i , , , , μ η ε + = , where  i η is the unobservable set of characteristics that are time invariant and 
t j i , , μ  is a pure random component. In this case, 












t = = = = = = − = − − − = − μ μ μ μ η η ε ε  is random and not related to the fact that the 
person is under the effects of privatization, and therefore,  1
~
β = DD  . 
 




For the dependent ( t j i Y , , ) variables we use the information from the Encuesta de Calidad de Vida 
(ECV) for the years 1997 and 2003. These household surveys have an extended questionnaire, 
with chapters that include information on household education, health, income, consumption, 
and shocks, as well as the characteristics of the household’s dwelling unit. We complement these 
data with health variables, related specifically to diseases caused by poorly treated water, from 
the 1995 and 2005 Demographic and Health Surveys (DHS).
11 
                                                 
11 These surveys are available at www.measuredhs.com.   14
It would be ideal to use a panel of households to compare outcomes through time, but 
unfortunately the available data do not allow us to do so. Instead, we have built a panel of 
municipalities for which we have information in both years.  Table 6 presents the municipalities 
for which there are observations for both years in the ECV survey (1997 and 2003), and for the 
two health variables, diarrhea and weight for height, from the 1995 and 2005 DHS. Based on the 
privatization process discussed above, we identify municipalities where water privatization took 
place and we form an unbalance panel dataset at the municipality level.  There are a total of 46 
municipalities with observations in both years for the ECV, and 36 more (for a total of 82) 
municipalities with health variables coming from the DHS for Colombia. 
Water privatizations presumably have an impact on the coverage, price, and quality of 
water, as well as on the incidence of health problems related to poor quality water. We measure 
coverage as a 0/1 dummy capturing access to water (e.g., connected to water services or not), 
price as the monthly payments made by the household (as percentage of total income
12) for water 
consumption, quality as the need for treatment for consumption, the frequency of service 
(continuity of services through the week) and the aspect (if it is turbid, or with particles) of the 
service, and for health variables we include children with diarrhea in the last two weeks (a 0/1 
dummy) and a measure of weight for height. We expect that one of the most important impacts 
of provision of water is on health indicators, as the literature shows (for instance, Galiani, 
Gertler, and Schargrodsky, 2005 ). 
Table 7 presents the means of the dependent measures for privatized and non-privatized 
municipalities in 1997 and 2003. Access to water is relatively high, with 94 percent and 96 
percent of households, respectively, having water service. Such high coverage may imply that 
marginal increments are quite difficult to achieve. Coverage does, however, vary between urban 
and rural areas, and to this end we present both the data and the estimations allowing for 
heterogeneity responses by urban andrural areas. Coverage of service increases with time, with 
no statistical differences between privatized and non-privatized municipalities. Expenditure on 
water services, as a percentage of the total income of the household, increases through time in 
both privatized and non-privatized municipalities. In terms of the quality of the service, the 
indicators show overall improvements between 1997 and 2003 in both types of municipalities. 
                                                 
12 This dependent variable was calculated also as monthly payments in 2003 pesos. The results do not change 
significantly.   15
Households do not report a difference in the need to treat piped water. However, with respect to 
the frequency and the aspect of water, privatized municipalities present worse outcomes than 
non-privatized ones. Regarding health outcomes from the ECV, in both privatized and non-
privatized municipalities we observe a general improvement between 1997 and 2003. Similarly, 
the diarrhea and height for weight indicators from the DHS present improvements between 1995 
and 2005.  There are no statistical differences in these indicators for privatized and non-
privatized municipalities over time.  
For control variables we use two types, one for household characteristics ( t i X , ) and one 
for municipal characteristics ( t j X , ). The sources for the first type of controls are the Encuesta de 
Calidad de Vida or the DHS, depending on the impact estimated.
13 The sources for the second 
type of controls are the National Department of Planning (DNP) and the National Department of 
Statistics (DANE).  
At the household level we include measures of housing characteristics, human capital and 
income. Housing characteristics include the following measures: whether the dwelling unit is in a 
rural or urban area, the type of ownership, and indices capturing the infrastructure of the house 
and the assets of the house. The infrastructure index includes the type of floor (0 if is inadequate, 
0.5 if it is fairly adequate and 1 otherwise), a natural risk factor (0 if the household faces a 
natural risk, 1 if not) and number of individuals per bedroom (0 if there is 2 or more people per 
bedroom, 1 otherwise). The asset index includes the existence of a washing machine, 
refrigerator, blender, oven, motorcycle, and car. Both indexes go from 0 to 1, where 1 indicates 
the highest quality of infrastructure or highest possible asset accumulation and 0 the lowest. 
Human capital variables include years of education (of all adults and of the head of the 
household) and some demographic variables (such as the size of the household, marital status 
and gender of the head, among others). Finally, income variables include income of the 
household from all sources (in constant pesos of 2003), total consumption (in constant pesos of 
2003), and employment, measured via occupancy (yes or no) of the head or all the adults in the 
household.  
Housing characteristics show the following trend. The percentage of rural households in 
the sample is between 11.9 percent and 8.5 percent for the 1997 and 2003 samples, respectively. 
                                                 
13 From the DHS we have the same type of household controls, except a measure of income. As shown below, the 
unavailability of these data prevented us to estimate the effects of privatizations on health by quintiles.    16
The sample of 2003 tends to be more urban induced by over-sampling of Bogota in 2003, and 
there are no differences in the percentage of households in rural areas for the privatized and non-
privatized municipalities. By 2003 around 87 percent of households owned a house (including 
houses that were totally paid for and houses whose owners were still making payments).   
Household ownership increased between 1997 and 2003, at a faster rate for the non-privatized 
municipalities. On average, the infrastructure index presented a small reduction over time. A 
typical house presents 60 percent of adequate infrastructure, and the index decreased slightly 
more for the privatized municipalities than for the non-privatized ones. In terms of the asset 
index, the typical household had in both years around 50 percent of the assets included in the 
index. There are no differences across time or across types of municipalities. 
Human capital characteristics are not different between privatized and non-privatized 
municipalities, with the exception of the age of the head of household, which is younger in 
privatized municipalities. The sample additionally shows improvement of indicators 
improvement for number of households and education, and there is some trend towards more 
migration in 2003 than in 1997. 
Average income falls dramatically between 1997 and 2003. In 1999 the country suffered 
a severe depression, and the recovery was very slow. This decline was especially pronounced for 
urban as opposed to rural areas, and for non-privatized than privatized municipalities; the latter 
result is driven by Bogota. In terms of employment, there is no difference in the employment rate 
of household heads, which is around 74 percent. In general, we do not find systematic 
differences between privatized and non-privatized municipalities regarding the “exogenous” 
variables. Some exceptions are per-capita income and homeownership. Despite these cases, there 
was not a clear direction of the differences.     
The second set of control variables are those that vary at the municipal level. The first set 
of municipal variables is fixed and time-invariant, and there are no differences between   
privatized and non-privatized in any of the municipal variables. In particular, there are no 
differences between the two groups in terms of surface area, distance to the state capital and 
altitude. Similarly, there are no differences in terms of the level of Unmet Basic Needs in 1993, 
and both types of municipalities had the same starting point in terms of income.  
The similarity in exogenous variables at both household and municipal level between 
privatized and non-privatized localities is critical in order to isolate the true effects of the   17
privatizations from other, exogenous differences in characteristics between privatized and non-








t X X X X = = = = − = −  will reduce the source 
of bias.  
The second set of municipal variables includes fiscal indicators that can be divided in 
three groups: indicators of technical capacity, municipal variables exogenous to the privatization 
process, and fiscal variables that may be endogenous to the privatization process. Indicators 
proxy to technical capacity are an important component of the effect of privatizations on welfare 
in the sense that there is a branch of the literature that proposes the hypothesis that privatization 
“works” in municipalities that have enough technical capacity to take advantage of the process. 
However, another type of causality may emerge. Indeed, technically sound municipalities that 
have been successful in running public services are less likely to privatize compared to 
municipalities with lower technical capacity that are unsuccessful in the provision of services. 
We develop the argument in the discussion of the results.     
In choosing the proxies for technical capacity we include income from local taxes as 
percentages of total municipal revenues (Local taxes revenues / Total revenues) and savings 
capacity ((Current Income-Current Expenditure) / Current Income), borrowing several ideas 
from the public finance literature (for the general case, see Bird and Smart, 2002, and Fiszbein, 
1997; and Chaparro, Smart and Zapata, 2006, for the case of Colombia). On one hand, local 
income taxes depend on three variables: the tax base, the level of the tax and the technical 
capacity of the municipality. Once we normalize local income dividing by total income, two 
municipalities that have an equal tax base and tax rate will have differences in the ratio thanks to 
the collection technical capacity. In turn, the technical capacity will depend on the human capital 
and the administrative capacity of the locality (Fiszbein, 1997). One clear example of this proxy 
of technical capacity is that local revenues depend, for instance, on the ability of the municipality 
to create a good measure of the size of property within the municipality. On the other hand, 
savings capacity is a critical variable for fiscal purposes. Local investment depends on the 
amount of transfers, debt and savings capacity. Usually, more advance and sound municipalities 
will use a bigger proportion of savings capacity to finance its own investment. For this reason, 
savings capacity can serve as well as a measure of technical capacity of the municipality. In 
short, municipalities with higher administrative and technical capacity are able to increase their 
local tax base, and municipalities with greater administrative capacity are able to accumulate   18
more current savings. We include these proxies in order to investigate the hypothesis of 
differential impacts of privatization depending on technical and administrate capacity, and taking 
into account that the regulatory framework applies to all firms, public and private, due to its 
centralization. 
For the group of fiscal variables exogenous to the privatization process we include 
transfers from central government revenues. These transfers are determined by a set of rules 
outside municipalities’ decision-making power and therefore in the short run exogenous for the 
municipality.  Finally, for the group of fiscal variables endogenous to the privatization process 
we include current income earmarked for administrative expenditures and investment 
expenditures as percentage of total expenditure. Clearly, privatization can ease the budget 
constraint and induce a reallocation of expenditure. Nevertheless, these two variables were not 
used as controls in the estimation, since they could generate endogeneity problems. 
In general terms, there exists an apparent upward time trend in revenues from local taxes 
for non-privatized municipalities (Figure 1, Appendix 1). For privatized municipalities, there is a 
drastic drop between 1994 and 1995, and stability since then. Despite the apparent difference 
between privatized and non-privatized municipalities, there is no significant difference at a 90 
percent confidence interval.  Current savings present a clear upward trend, from 1994 to 2004, 
for both privatized and non-privatized municipalities (Figure 2, Appendix 1) with no significant 
difference between the privatized and non-privatized municipalities. In sum, there is no evidence 
of differences in technical capacity between one group and the other.  
Transfers to municipalities do not differ either between privatized and non-privatized 
(Figure 3, Appendix 1). Transfers have been increasing steadily since 1994. Current income 
intended for current operational present a clear negative slope since 1994, with no significant 
difference between privatized and non-privatized municipalities (Figure 4, Appendix 1). Finally, 
revenues used for investment have been increasing since 1994 for both types of localities, again 
with no statistical difference across both types of localities (Figure 5, Appendix 1). 
 
4.2  Results 
 
Tables 8 to 12 present the results of the estimations of equations (2a) and (2b). For all the 
impacts the tables report the coefficients for the dummy that capture time changes (denoted by 
Time(t)), for the dummy that captures if the municipality is privatized or not (Private(P)), and for   19
the impact (P*t, which correspond to the DD estimator). All regressions include household and 
municipal controls, and we report regressions with and without variables that control for 
technical municipal capacity. The tables show also models in which we allow heterogeneity of 
treatment across quintiles of income, and for urban-rural sub-samples.  
Briefly, the rationale fore including these four types of regressions (without controlling 
for technical capacity, controlling for technical capacity, quintile heterogeneity and urban/rural 
heterogeneity) is the following. First, controlling (or not) for technical capacity is important in 
light of the privatization literature emphasizing that privatization that privatization is more 
successful in municipalities with higher technical capacity. Second, allowing for quintile 
heterogeneity is important in order to determine the effects of privatization on households at the 
left of the income distribution. Finally, allowing for urban/rural differences is important because, 
as shown above, average levels of connection to water are very high in Colombia. As it turns out, 
the effects of privatization are greater in urban than rural areas; privatization apparently works in 
high-density areas that probably had infrastructure in place before privatization.  
For access, there is no evidence of positive impact of privatization when the model does 
not include municipalities’ technical capacity. The results do not show statistical differences 
between privatized and non-privatized localities, even after controlling for technical capacity. In 
addition, there are no significant differences in the effects of privatization on access across 
income quintiles. However, when we estimate urban and rural sub-samples, we find that 
coverage increased in privatized urban areas by around 2.4 percentage points. This effect 
disappears when we include municipal technical capacity as a control, suggesting that 
municipalities with technical capacity can somehow “compete” with private companies. An 
example is the city of Medellin, where the Medellin Public Enterprise (EPM for its acronym in 
Spanish) is one of the most efficient public enterprises. However, on the other hand, we find a 
strong negative effect on access in rural areas (Table 8). 
On average, we do not observe any effects of privatization on prices. However, when we 
allow for heterogeneous responses from different quintiles of income, the data show higher 
prices increases for lower quintiles. Two reasons explain this result. First, due to the elimination 
of cross-subsidies in the water sector, quintiles 1 and 2 spend more of their total income for this 
utility, while the fourth quintile pays less. The effect is important. Lower quintiles pay an 
additional 7 to 11 percent in relation to their income, while for the fourth quintile the share of   20
income used to pay for water declined by 10 percent. Second, households in rural areas that 
privatized spend a higher amount of their income on water and sewerage, an estimated 3.2 
percent of their income. This effect disappears, however, when we control for technical capacity 
(Table 9). 
With respect to quality, households in localities that privatized have to treat less the water 
than in the non-privatized ones, and in particular households in urban privatized areas, 
independently of the technical capacity of the municipality (Table 10, Panel A).  When the 
quality of water is measured as the frequency of the service, it is higher in non-privatized urban 
municipalities, although the second quintile presents an improvement in the frequency of the 
service compared to the fourth and fifth quintiles. Also, in rural privatized areas the frequency of 
the service is higher by a large percentage (i.e., around 20 percentage points higher; see Table 
10, Panel B). The last quality of service variable is the subjective perception of the household 
with respect to the aspect of water.
14 In this case, for the whole sample water has better aspect in 
privatized areas, although the effect disappears when we control for technical capacity. However, 
the effect is positive in urban privatized areas (Table 10, Panel C).   
Another way to see the influence of municipal technical capacity is to estimate the effect 
of this variable in privatized municipalities (i.e., the interaction between technical capacity and 
the privatization dummy; see Table 11). These estimations show that the effects of privatizations 
in municipalities with better technical capacity are positive on access, prices and quality 
(measured as frequency of service). These results suggest that better technical capacity might 
result in better control (i.e., government regulation). 
With respect to health, we do not find effects of privatization on diarrhea in general.
15 
However, we find that in rural areas that privatized the effect of privatization is a reduction of 
around 11 percentage points in the number of children with diarrhea. Although the effect is 
reversed when we control for technical capacity, the estimation losses degrees of freedom due to 
data availability
16  (Table 12, Panel A). Finally, with respect to the measure of weight for height, 
the effect of privatizations is also positive and significant when we include technical capacity as 
                                                 
14 For this measure the ECV has data only for 2003.  
15 Given that the DHS survey does not include questions about income, the estimations by quintiles are not included 
in this and the next table. 
16 Notice, however, that when we include technical capacity of the municipalities as control, the number of 
observations decreases significantly. This is due to the fact that, as stated above, the source of the dependent variable 
(DHS Survey) does include additional municipalities, with fewer habitants interviewed, and there is no data 
availability of measures of technical capacity for these new municipalities.   21
control: municipalities that privatized has a measure of weight and height of the children higher 
compared to the median than municipalities that did not privatized, and, in particular, urban 
areas. This result of variation over time is more important since, as showed in the description of 
the variables, in privatized municipalities the measure of weight for height is lower than the 
median and also compared to non-privatized municipalities (Table 12, Panel B). 
 
 
5. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 
 
In sum, we find positive effects of privatizations. Access increased in privatized urban areas; 
water in privatized areas needs less treatment for use; the frequency of service in privatized areas 
is lower, but higher for the lower quintiles; the incidence of diarrhea in children in rural 
privatized areas is lower; and the measure of weight for height is higher in privatized 
municipalities. In addition, municipal technical capacity is important in generating these positive 
effects, potentially through better regulation. The negative effect related to payment seems to be 
more related to the elimination of cross-subsidies between the higher and the lower quintiles. 
Finally, the positive effects on health and quality in rural areas are outweighed by negative 
effects on prices and access. 
The results of this paper suggest several points for policy implementation. In general, we 
found that the effects of privatization are not homogenous across income and across areas, and  
heterogeneity on impact has several implications. From the point of view of the political 
economy of the process, it is important to realize that the effects are not homogenous across all 
households; it may therefore be useful to have in place targeted policies to mitigate negative 
effects. While this paper finds overall positive outcomes from privatization, the unpopularity of 
privatization stems from other sources. These may include localized effects, mainly in the price 
system.   
Privatization is apparently working better in urban than rural areas. These effects are 
quite interesting, since it is believed that reaching the marginal house is more costly when the 
provision of the service is already high. On the contrary, and despite higher levels of 
connectivity in urban areas, privatization is working in dense cities. The challenge is to expand 
the benefits to the rural areas, and incentives to increase rural access may need to be generated 
through regulation.     22
It should additionally be noted that there are some cross-effects of privatization for low-
income households. There are some positive effects on quality of the service and, in general, 
health outcomes that presumably affect more low-income families. In contrast, the price of 
service has been increasing more for low quintiles in privatized locations, and it appears likely 
that the increment in prices reflects the simultaneity of privatization and elimination of cross- 
subsidies. Despite the economic rationality of dismantling the subsidy systems, so that prices 
more accurately reflect the marginal cost of providing service, it may be preferable to improve 
the focus of cross-subsidies rather than eliminate them altogether. For example, Gómez-Lobo 
and Contreras (2003) discuss the differences between a means-tested system, such as Chile’s, 
and Colombia’s geographical system, concluding that targeting by a means-tested instrument 
results in better focalization.   
In terms of regulation, one of the main area where regulation should focus is on quality 
measures of the service such as the frequency of service, water quality in terms of treatment, and 
the aspect of water. Second, regulation should generate incentives to increase access in rural 
areas.    23
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Figure 4. Four Largest Cities Sewerage Total Increase in Tariffs (2001-2004) 
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Table 1. Enterprises with Private Participation that Attend Municipalities with Population 
Greater than 100,000 
Enterprise Municipality >50% >50%, <10% >10% % Year of privatization Type of Contract Partner
Triple A* Baranquilla x 80 1991 Concession Aguas de Barcelona
Acuacar* Cartagena x 45 1995 Concession
CAMB-CDMB* Bucaramanga x 5 Joint venture Local
Metroagua SA Santa Marta x 65 1996 Concession Aguas de Barcelona
Aguas de Manizales Manizales x 1 Joint venture Local
Acuaviva Palmira x 60 Concession Suez
Proactiva Monteria x 100 2000 Concession Proactiva
Aap Popayan x Joint venture
Conhydra Buenaventura x 2002
Centro agua Tulua x
Acuagyr Girardot x 70 Concession Suez
Servaf Florencia x 51 Joint venture Local
Aguas de Peninsula Maicao x 2001
Sera q.a. Tunja x 100 1996 Concession Proactiva
Aguas de Guajira Rioacha x 2000
Sincelejo Sincelejo 2002
Soledad Soledad 2002
Source: Authors calculations from CRA (2002), DNP (2005), and Fernandez (2004).
Private participation




Table 2. Projects with Private Participation Implemented by PME 
Department Municipalities Population Initial date of operation
Atlantico Sabanagrande y Santo Tomas (Asoasa) 44,000 August 2002
Atlantico Ponedera 9,100 August 2002
Sucre Sincelejo, Corozal 2,800,500 December 2002
Sucre San Marcos 32,750 August 2002
Choco Itsmina 13,500 October 2001
Choco Trado 9,100 October 2001
Guajira Barrancas, Distraccion, El Molino, Villanueva (Asoaguas) 42,700 June 2002
Cauca Guapi 14,000 January 2002
Bolivar San Juan Nepomuceno 27,000 December 2001
Huila Nataga 1,800 April 2001
Magdalena El Banco 51,700 February 2003
Meta Cumaral 9,200 January 2002
Narino El Charco 5,300 January 2002
Vichada Puerto Carreno 7,500 January 2002













 Table 3. Coverage of Water and Sewerage Systems 
Enterprise Municipality 1998 2001 1998 2001 1990 1998 2001 1990 1998 2001 Users Coverage Users Coverage
Triple A Baranquilla* 226918 253116 175339 209778 89 94 76 80 3,7 1,7 6,2 1,7
Acuacar Cartagena* 100571 137749 86778 110396 79 94 68 75 11,1 5,9 8,4 3,5
CAMB-CDMB Bucaramanga* 161771 171365 160465 169606 84 99 99 99 99 1,9 0 1,9 -0,1
Metroagua SA Santa Marta 61833 51092 85 70
Aguas de Manizales Manizales 77126 73401 82 96 77 93
Acuaviva Palmira 47270 49230 46374 48739 98 97 96 96 1,4 -0,4 1,7 -0,1
Proactiva Monteria 39746 19646 76 38
Aap Popayan 44554 49275 41779 46606 95 98 90 93 3,4 1,1 3,7 1,1
Conhydra Buenaventura
Centro agua Tulua 33677 36135 33049 33899 97 98 95 97 2,4 0,5 0,9 0,9
Acuagyr Girardot 26135 22571 97 83
Servaf Florencia 22509 12285 85 46
Aguas de Peninsula Maicao
Sera q.a. Tunja 27777 27296 98 96
Aguas de Guajira Rioacha
EMPAS Sincelejo 35509 31551 79 69
Soledad
Enterprise Municipality 1998 2001 1998 2001 1990 1998 2001 1990 1998 2001 Users Coverage Users Coverage
EAAB Bogota* 1195147 1206160 1082045 1206160 88 93 95 64 93 95 0,3 0,7 3,7 0,6
EPM Medellin* 694485 760821 680939 728853 98 99 100 94 94 93 3,1 0,3 2,3 -0,6
EMCALI Cali* 422899 436799 402295 418677 89 92 96 75 94 94 1,1 1,4 1,3 0
E.I.C.E Cucuta 106869 121991 93913 118489 86 90 96 88 4,5 1,5 8,1 -3
A y A  Pereira 89934 87193 82 96 77 94
IBAL Ibague 84276 80042 89 85
EMPOPASTO Pasto 53804 53529 89 89
EE PP Neiva 65595 62509 86 99 81 95
EE PP Armenia 67543 66874 96 95
EAAV Villavicencio 48475 53547 53610 59576 72 80 80 89 3,4 3,4 3,6 3,6
EMDUPAR Valledupar 43606 48648 43610 46754 99 99 87 90 3,7 0 2,3 1,3
Sogamoso 24078 26602 20004 22455 97 100 66 90 3,4 1,1 3,9 10,9
Source: Own construction from CRA (2002), DNP (2005), and Fernandez (2004).
Annual increase 1998-2001
Number of users Coverage (%) Annual increase 1998-2001
Sanitation Water
Panel A: Municipalities with Private Participation
Panel B: Municipalities without Private Participation
Sanitation
Sanitation Water Water
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Table 4. Average Tariff 































Lower income  / higher 
income tariff (%) **
Triple A* Baranquilla 55,3
Acuacar* Cartagena 58,5
Metroagua SA Santa Marta 68,6










A y A  Pereira 54,2
IBAL Ibague 65,6
EMPOPASTO Pasto 60,6
EE PP Neiva 60,2





Source: Authors calculation based on SSPD (2002)
Notes: * serves cities with population greater than 600.000. The rest serves cities with 
** Lower income is the average for stratum 1, 2 and 3, higher income is the average 
Panel B: Municipalities without Private Participation
Panel A: Municipalities with Private Participation  28
Table 5. Average Consumption 
(M3/month/user) 








Sratum 1 21,4 14,8 -30,9 -8,8 17,9 13,8 -22,9 -6,3
Sratum 2 22,7 15,4 -32,2 -9,3 19,7 14,9 -24,2 -6,8
Sratum 3 22,0 14,5 -34,2 -9,9 19,6 16,0 -17,4 -5,0
Sratum 4 17,7 13,9 -21,5 -5,9 20,8 18,0 -14,0 -3,6
Sratum 5 19,5 16,2 -17,1 -4,6 24,7 20,2 -17,3 -4,8
Sratum 6 21,8 19,0 -13,1 -3,4 36,0 26,8 -25,5 -7,1
Sratum 1 23,8 20,0 -16,1 -4,3 14,0 15,7 -11,8 -2,8
Sratum 2 27,6 21,9 -20,6 -5,6 31,1 23,1 -25,8 -7,2
Sratum 3 23,8 21,3 -10,6 -2,8 35,7 23,2 -35,0 -10,2
Sratum 4 23,6 21,6 -8,2 -2,1 37,9 23,8 -37,2 -11,0
Sratum 5 27,6 25,9 -6,3 -1,6 43,2 26,2 -39,4 -11,8
Sratum 6 35,2 35,6 -0,9 0,0 47,6 32,8 -31,1 -8,9
Sratum 1 29,3 18,9 -35,7 -10,4 21,6 12,8 -40,9 -12,3
Sratum 2 28,4 19,9 -30,0 -8,5 24,2 15,7 -35,0 -10,2
Sratum 3 25,2 19,1 -24,1 -6,7 25,9 17,6 -32,1 -9,2
Sratum 4 24,6 21,4 -13,0 -3,4 27,0 20,0 -25,7 -7,2
Sratum 5 27,8 24,8 -10,8 -2,8 29,9 23,3 -21,8 -6,0
Sratum 6 31,9 29,7 -6,9 -1,8 33,2 22,7 -31,8 -9,1
Cartagena






































Municipality Privatized Non Privatized Municpality Privatized Non Privatized
Aratoca x Alto Baudó x
Arauca x Baranoa x
Barbosa x Betulia x
Barrancabermeja x Buenaventura x
Barranquilla x Buga x
Bello x Cajibío x
Bogota x Candelaria x
Bucaramanga x Caparrapí x
Caicedo x Chigorodó x
Caldas x Chinú x
Cali x Corozal x
Cartagena x Coyaima x
Chia x Cumbal x
Cienaga x El Guacamayo x
Copacabana x Istmina x
Cucuta x Majagual x
Dos Quebradas x Mogotes x
Envigado x Neiva x
Floridablanca x Ortega x
Girardota x Palmira x
Giron x Plato x
Ibague x Popayán x
Itagui x Puerto Salgar x
Lorica x Riosucio x
Los Patios x Saboya x
Manizales x Salgar x
Medellin x San Bernardo del Viento x
Montenegro x San jacinto x
Monteria x San Martín x
Pasto x Sibaté x
Pereira x Sogamoso x
Piedecuesta x Subachoque x
Pitalito x Trujillo x
Providencia x Túquerres x
Riohacha x Turmequé x
Roldanillo x Urumita x
San Andrés x
Santa Marta x








Table 6- Municipalities that appear in both years of the survey

















































1997 2003 1997 2003 1997 2003
a. Coverage
Access (Dummy 1-0) 0,940 0,959 0,910 0,936 0,948 0,966 -0,001
Payment 0,076 0,086 0,081 0,095 0,075 0,084 0,005
b.Quality
Water treatment (Dummy 1-0) 0,318 0,507 0,330 0,465 0,315 0,519 -0,069
Frequency of Service (Dummy 1-0) 0,800 0,859 0,771 0,806 0,807 0,874 -0,031 *
Aspect (Dummy 1-0) 0,844 0,819 0,851 -0,032 *
c. Health outcomes
Health status (Dummy 1-0) 0,724 0,772 0,719 0,768 0,725 0,773 -0,026
Hospitalizations (Dummy 1-0) 0,074 0,068 0,061 0,072 0,077 0,068 0,019
Health problems (Dummy 1-0) 0,158 0,102 0,149 0,155 0,160 0,098 0,053
Diarrea (Dummy 1-0) 
1/ 0,157 0,133 0,177 0,145 0,151 0,131 0,007
Height for weight 
1/ 0,095 0,060 -0,068 -0,100 0,138 0,090 0,005
a. Infrastructure
Zone (Urban or rural) 1,119 1,085 1,132 1,086 1,116 1,084 -0,015
Ownership (Dummy 1-0) 0,806 0,869 0,778 0,809 0,813 0,886 -0,043 *
Rooms (Number of) 3,506 3,504 3,542 3,547 3,497 3,492 0,011
Risk (Dummy 1-0) 0,001 0,124 0,000 0,169 0,001 0,110 0,060 *
Infrastructure index  0,688 0,669 0,645 0,610 0,700 0,686 -0,021 *
Assets index 0,476 0,482 0,457 0,459 0,480 0,488 -0,006
b. Human capital 
Number of persons per house 4,022 3,699 4,278 3,952 3,955 3,627 0,002
Head's education (Total years) 7,473 8,033 7,405 8,075 7,490 8,021 0,140
Average education  (Total years) 7,841 8,895 7,841 9,026 7,841 8,858 0,168
Head's age 46,200 47,009 45,686 45,586 46,334 47,415 -1,180 *
Recent migrants  0,078 0,100 0,082 0,109 0,077 0,098 0,005
Head's marital status (Dummy 1-0) 0,676 0,631 0,688 0,634 0,672 0,630 -0,011
Head's gender (Dummy 1-2, 1=Male) 1,279 1,336 1,275 1,340 1,280 1,335 0,010
c. Income
Percapita income (Constant $ 2003) 744.644 $        466.381 $      497.036 $      404.670 $      809.002 $       483.980 $      232.656 $      *
Percapita consumption (Constant $ 2003) 569.071 $        538.631 $      463.272 $      490.800 $      596.570 $       552.272 $      71.825 $        *
Head's labor income (Constant $ 2003) 1.000.131 $     647.908 $      874.614 $      534.086 $      1.033.791 $    680.893 $      12.371 $       
Head employed 0,758 0,738 0,764 0,750 0,757 0,734 0,009
a. Exogenous characteristics 
Recent migrantion (Dummy 1-0) 0,105 0,125 0,085 0,091 0,082 0,133 -0,018
NBI -3,946
Population -14397,5
Surface area (Kms2) -557,019
Distance to state capital (Kms) 47,263
Altitude (From sea level) 673,825
b. Tecnical capacity indices  (TCI)
Own resources 23,828 26,740 25,772 24,573 23,282 27,267 -5,184
Saving capacity 57,357 74,345 56,354 77,725 57,639 73,523 5,487
Income from national transfers 40,060 54,337 43,758 63,757 39,021 52,046 6,973
Source: Authors calculations with data from DANE for municipalities characteristics , DNP for TCI
Note: *Statistically significant at the 5% level; **Statistically significant at the 10% level; Difference in time and between privatized and non privatized
1/ These two variables come from the DHS survey and the years before and after privatizations are 1995 and 2005 respectively.
Panel Municipalities  Privatized Non privatized









































Privatized (P) -0,0057 0,0042 *** 0,0028 * 0,0077 ** -0,1035 0,0353 0,5103 ***
-0,0068 -0,0015 -0,0016 -0,0032 -0,1535 -0,1561 -0,1537
Time (t) -0,0008 -0,0014 ** -0,0005 -0,0011 -0,0040 ** -0,0193 0,0624
-0,0005 -0,0006 -0,0008 -0,0008 -0,0017 -0,0332 -0,0570
P*t -0,0003 -0,0031 0,0024 *** 0,0012 -0,4570 *** -0,5746 ***











R-Squared 0,58 0,58 0,59 0,35 0,37 0,28 0,31
No. Obs. 21406 21003 21003 15852 15693 2197 1922
TCI No Yes Yes No Yes No Yes
Notes:
Standard errors in parenthesis
All regressions include the controls described in the text and in Table 7
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%,*** significant at 1%
Urban Rural
Dependent Variable: Access (Dummy 1-0)
Table 8 - Water coverage
Quintiles
Privatized (P) -0,0422 -0,0134 -0,1113 -0,0246 -0,0192 -0,0273 * -0,0205
-0,0737 -0,2463 0,2466 -0,0236 -0,0316 -0,0146 -0,0218
Time (t) 0,0103 ** 0,0203 ** 0,0043 0,0106 0,0238 0,0142 ** 0,0140
-0,0046 -0,0080 0,0176 -0,0066 -0,0170 -0,0057 -0,0091
P*t -0,0076 -0,0021 -0,0092 -0,0034 -0,0085 0,0318 *











R-Squared 0,04 0,04 0,05 0,04 0,04 0,20 0,20
No. Obs. 16398 16168 16168 15321 15201 1077 967
TCI No Yes Yes No Yes No Yes
Notes:
Standard errors in parenthesis
All regressions include the controls described in the text and in Table 7
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%,*** significant at 1%
Table 9 - Payment
Dependent Variable: Payment (% of total income of the household)




Privatized (P) -0,3349 *** -0,3045 * -0,2561 -0,3632 *** 0,0045 0,2504 -0,1285
-0,0646 -0,1684 -0,1825 -0,0860 -0,1438 -0,1962 -0,2065
Time (t) 0,2401 *** 0,2961 *** 0,1643 *** 0,2620 *** 0,3407 *** 0,1085 *** 0,0628
-0,0121 -0,0194 -0,0369 -0,0132 -0,0227 -0,0305 -0,0478
P*t -0,1011 *** -0,0868 *** -0,1021 *** -0,0644 * 0,0286 0,0981











R-Squared 0,1494 0,1516 0,1617 0,1692 0,1717 0,1251 0,1242
No. Obs. 22475 22072 22072 20076 19888 2383 2168
TCI No Yes Yes No Yes No Yes
Privatized (P) 0,2784 *** 0,2963 *** 0,2570 *** 0,2547 *** 0,2719 *** -0,5069 ** -0,6777 ***
-0,0246 -0,0287 -0,0316 -0,0263 -0,0312 -0,2161 -0,1917
Time (t) 0,0587 *** 0,0564 *** 0,0384 0,0692 *** 0,0489 *** -0,0884 ** -0,1134
-0,0090 -0,0136 -0,0246 -0,0094 -0,0165 -0,0413 -0,0758
P*t -0,0381 * -0,0421 * -0,0544 ** -0,0306 0,2158 *** 0,2357 ***











R-Squared 0,3178 0,3087 0,3180 0,3461 0,3275 0,2247 0,2190
No. Obs. 20570 20296 20296 18975 18796 1311 1225
TCI No Yes Yes No Yes No Yes
Privatized (P) 0,1776 *** -0,0979 -0,0927 0,0976 * -0,0234 0,0904











R-Squared 0,1197 0,1197 0,1239 0,1332 0,1332 0,0881 0,0881
No. Obs. 17569 17569 17569 16123 16123 1337 1337
TCI No Yes Yes No Yes No Yes
Notes:
Standard errors in parenthesis
All regressions include the controls described in the text and in Table 7
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%,*** significant at 1%
Dependent Variable: Frequency of Service (Dummy 1-0)
Dependent Variable: Aspect (Dummy 1-0)
Table 10 - Quality
Dependent Variable: Water Treatment (Dummy 1-0)

























(% of total 





Local tax revenues * Privatized 0,0006 ** -0,0086 *** -0,0213
-0,0003 -0,0033 -0,0140
Saving Capacity * Privatized 0,0013 *** -0,0171 -0,0844 ***
-0,0004 -0,0191 -0,0145
Transfers * Privatized -0,0001 0,0063 0,0415 ***
-0,0003 -0,0112 -0,0072
R-Squared 0,58 0,04 0,32
No. Obs. 21003 16168 20296
Notes:
Standard errors in parenthesis
All regressions include the controls described in the text and in Table 7
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%,*** significant at 1%
Table 11 - Privatization With Technical Capacity of the Municipalities
Privatized (P) -0,0470 -0,0640 0,1994 -0,0477 -0,1893 *** -0,1098
0,0503 0,0497 -0,1882 -0,0775 -0,0417 -0,2006
Time (t) -0,0342 *** -0,0469 *** -0,0380 *** -0,0497 ** -0,0374 ** 0,0155
0,0098 0,0219 -0,0121 -0,0229 -0,0167 -0,0809
P*t 0,0074 0,0043 -0,0051 0,0058 0,1191 * -0,1515 ***
0,0184 0,0288 -0,0192 -0,0302 -0,0715 -0,0555
R-Squared 0,03 0,03 0,04 0,03 0,05 0,16
No. Obs. 9649 4958 6788 4551 2824 402
T C I N oY e s N oY e s N oY e s
Privatized (P) -0,2352 -0,4075 0,2129 0,2324 -0,6134 ** -0,6606
0,1732 * 0,1355 *** -0,6782 -0,2686 -0,2736 -0,6433
Time (t) -0,0460 -0,0371 -0,0567 -0,0274 -0,0051 -0,4867 **
0,0284 ** 0,0627 -0,0358 -0,0458 -0,0659 -0,2121
P*t 0,0337 0,2693 -0,0006 0,2895 * 0,2480 *** 0,2167
0,0539 0,0819 *** -0,0604 -0,1522 -0,0856 -0,3088
R-Squared 0,04 0,04 0,05 0,07 0,04 0,15
No. Obs. 9214 4735 6505 2709 4342 393
T C I N oY e s N oY e s N oY e s
Notes:
Standard errors in parenthesis
All regressions include the controls described in the text and in Table 7
* significant at 10%, ** significant at 5%,*** significant at 1%
Urban
Dependent variable: Children with diarrhea in the last 2 weeks (%)
Dependent variable: Weight for Height standard deviations from the reference median
Rural
Urban Rural
Table 12 - Health   34
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Appendix 2. Questions from the ECV 
 
This annex presents the questions that we used to construct the dependent variable of the study. 
for the sake of space we present questions numbers referring to the ECV 2003, the questions for 
1997 where made comparable.  
 
I.  Access to public services: water, sewer and energy.  
Question c3: Payment of electricity (includes option of “not connected”) 
Question c4: How much did you pay for electricity 
Question c6:  Which type of sewer do you have? (includes option of “not have”) 
 
II.  Quality of services: perception of quality of services and health outcomes: 
Question c5: How do you consider the quality of the energy? (Options: very bad, bad, regular, 
good and very good) 
Question c18: Does the service of water comes all seven days of the week? 
Question c19: In the days that it arrives, it is continuous 24 hours? 
Question c22: Does the water presents the following characteristics? Particles, bad taste, bad 
odor, bad color, none of the above 
Question f8: The health of each member of the household is: very good, good, regular, bad 
Question f11: In the last 30 days, did you have any disease, accident, or other health problem? 
Question f24: In the last 12 months, did you have to be in the hospital? 
 
 
The last three question where considered only for children 5 years of age and younger, 
under the assumption that access and quality of water is one of the most important determinants 
of health outcomes in children. 
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